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A Right to Respond? Monopolisation of 
‘Voice’ in CMS* 
Edward Wray-Bliss 
This paper explores the power effects of, and possible justifications for, the differential ‘voice’ and 
‘silence’ accorded academic and non-academic subjects within Critical Management Studies (CMS). I 
explore these issues through a discussion of the practice of ‘giving voice’ to some subjects critiqued in 
CMS journal articles by providing them with the opportunity to publish a ‘response’. I question the 
justification for extending this right only to academic subjects, and use this example to provoke CMS to 
question further its institutional orientation to issues of voice and silence in relation to the non-academic 
research subject.  
Introduction 
This paper uses the concepts of ‘silence’ and ‘voice’ to reflect upon relations between 
subjects involved in and touched by, Critical Management Studies (CMS) research. I 
explore such questions as who is ‘silenced’ and how, and who is accorded ‘voice’ and 
why, in CMS research. The decision to use these concepts was prompted by reflections 
on my own previous experience of publishing a paper in Organization and having this 
paper responded to by another academic. In Wray-Bliss (2002a) I wrote a critique of the 
power relations reproduced between researcher and researched in Foucauldian Labour 
Process Theory. I argued that researchers were failing to embody their espoused critical 
(Foucauldian) ethics in their relations with the researched, with one effect of this being 
that they (we) thereby reproduced the wider subordination of these research subjects’ 
lives and voices. In addition to publishing my article, the editors of the journal invited 
two senior academics, whose papers were amongst those I cited, to respond to my 
critique – one of these took up the invitation (Collinson, 2002) and responded critically 
to my work. Then, and now, this process caused me some unease, for a number of 
reasons. First, Collinson’s (2002) response prompted me to a keener awareness that my 
__________ 
*  I am most grateful to Jo Brewis, Sarah Gilmore, Damian O’Doherty, Sam Warren, the convenors of 
the ‘Silence and Voice in Organizational Life’ stream at the 2003 Critical Management Studies 
Conference, Lancaster 7th – 9th 2003, and the editors and reviewers of ephemera for their helpful 
comments on this paper. 
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academic voice can be experienced as potentially silencing by research subjects, 
including when such subjects of my research are themselves prominent, published 
academics. Second, I couldn’t help comparing the lengthy (two years plus) submission 
and revision procedure that I had to undergo to have a public/ published ‘voice’ with the 
fast-tracked, invited, right to respond accorded the more senior academic. Ultimately, 
however, what caused me most unease was not the differential right to voice accorded 
junior versus senior academics, but rather the marked lack of attentiveness to 
procedures for according a similar right to a dissenting/ responding voice to non-
academic research subjects. It struck me as a troubling paradox that a key effect of my 
paper criticising the academic’s subordinating ‘authoritative’ voice vis-à-vis the non-
academic research subject was to enable one of these ‘authorities’ to have a further 
privileged right to voice a response – a right not accorded the non-academic research 
subjects problematised in the pieces of research I was critiquing. This last concern 
prompted this paper. Specifically, I explore here whether the ‘right to respond’ accorded 
to certain academic subjects can be understood to symbolise a problematic wider 
institutional orientation in CMS that continues to privilege the voices of researcher and 
academic research subject over those of non-academic subjects of CMS research.  
In the first section of this paper I map-out the understanding of ‘silence’ and ‘voice’ that 
I am drawing upon. I do this through an exploration of (feminist and post-colonial) texts 
located within the wider social science academy, texts that have explicitly explored 
issues of silence and voice as a central warrant for, and problematic of, politically and 
ethically engaged academic research. In Section Two I overlay the issues and 
problematics such texts have raised onto research relations in CMS. Highlighting how 
CMS challenges the silencing effects of mainstream management research and is 
concerned to explore the voices of hitherto excluded or disempowered organisational 
subjects, I suggest that the politically and ethically charged concepts of ‘silence’ and 
‘voice’ can be understood to be central to CMS’s critical warrant. Notwithstanding this 
however, and while acknowledging some significant examples to the contrary, I argue 
that there are indications that the parameters of CMS seem to be becoming constructed 
in such a way that the voices of i) researcher, ii) of other academics whose voice is 
critiqued in CMS texts, and iii) of the non-academic research subject of empirical CMS 
articles, are receiving questionably uneven treatment. I explore as a telling symbol of 
this uneven treatment the above mentioned ‘right to respond’ accorded some senior 
academic subjects. I suggest that we view this ‘right to respond’ or ‘right to a dissenting 
voice’ as both a recognition of the potentially silencing effects of CMS research and an 
attempt to mitigate against these effects – at least for these specific subjects. Through 
rehearsing, and critiquing, a number of potential opposing arguments, I explore in 
Section Three whether a similar opportunity for dissenting/ responding voice should be 
extended to non-academic research subjects. Finding no compelling ethical 
justifications in CMS for not extending such ‘voice’ to these subjects, I explore in the 
conclusion some tentative practical suggestions as to how CMS could develop so as to 
better ‘hear’ such voices.  
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Section One: Hearing Silence and Voice in Research 
Reflecting upon the academic research process in terms of silence and voice places 
issues of subjectivity, appropriation, representation, and empowerment central to 
research practice and its products. Within the wider social science academy, it has been 
feminist (hooks, 1989; Fonow and Cook, 1991; Lincoln, 1993, 1995; Maynard and 
Parvis, 1994; Smith, 1990; Stanley and Wise, 1983), post-colonial (Opie, 1992; Said, 
1978; Spivak, 1990) and other reflexive ethical/ political researchers (Barnes, Mercer 
and Shakespeare, 1999; Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; McLaughlin and Tierney, 1993; 
Reason, 1994) who have engaged most consistently and critically with such issues.  
‘Voice’ in such formulations, represents an explicit concern with the question of “who 
speaks for those who do not have access to the corridors of knowledge or the venues of 
the academic disciplines?” (Lincoln, 1995: 282). Voice here is political, it is the right 
and opportunity for self-representation and involvement in the construction of 
knowledge about oneself and one’s group/ culture. Voice is understood as “resistance 
against silence, as resistance to disengagement, as resistance to marginalization” (ibid.). 
‘Silence’ is not inconsequential in these formulations, but is a distinct lack or rather 
removal of the opportunity to have a voice. Silence is understood as oppression/ 
suppression, it is expressed as a verb (others – Others – are silenced), and it also implies 
a subject position, the silenced. The silenced are defined by writers such as LeCompte 
(1993) as those individuals or groups, including “children, the disabled, women, 
members of minority groups, homosexuals, and lower participants in formal 
organizations”, who have been “deprived of voice without their consent – (such) that 
they are victims of oppression” (LeCompte, 1993: 10).  
For researchers concerned to challenge such oppression, an attempt to enable the 
silenced to have a voice in the process of knowledge construction raises a number of 
problematics. For instance, the researcher may need to seek out the silenced, decide 
which communities or individuals to research, decide who to work with, whose voice 
they are going to try to hear and have heard. Such choices, as LeCompte (1993) tells us, 
are frequently made not just on the basis that a particular community has historically 
lacked a public voice. Research subjects are also chosen when there is a belief that their 
views will be counter-hegemonic, representing a valuable challenge to dominant power-
structures, relations of production, or the academic canon (ibid.). Researching such 
groups can raise issues of practical and effective access too. For example, longer ‘time 
in the field’ is likely to be required for researchers to build up, and prove, relations of 
trust with groups of people who, almost by definition of occupying the category of 
‘silenced’, may not have had much (positive) experience of contact with formal 
institutions and authorities. Furthermore, as Lincoln (1995) highlights with reference to 
a number of researchers engaging with historically silenced groups (Brown, 1992; 
Lather, 1995), to fulfill such trust expectations relationships may need to extend far 
beyond the point where the researcher has finished their data collection. Intersecting 
across each of these above concerns however are wider issues of power-relations 
concerning processes of categorisation (who defines ‘the silenced’ as silenced?) and 
appropriation (by being so-defined should they necessarily be subjects of/ subject to 
academic research?). On the latter point, it is possible, even perhaps probable, that  
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by the very act of engaging in critical, emancipatory, empowering research, researchers take a 
particular ethical stance toward their informants, defining them as disempowered or oppressed, 
regardless of how the informants define themselves. (LeCompte, 1993: 13, emphasis added) 
Such a possibility raises the risk that the researcher appropriates the researched’s voice 
to reproduce their own particular critical ideology (Opie, 1992), such that the researched 
can become represented as, for instance, bearers of class struggle, fighting against 
patriarchy, or victims of colonialism irrespective of how they may define themselves. 
Paradoxically the researcher, who may self-identify as being engaged in a critical 
academic project to, for instance, challenge oppression or ‘hear’ hitherto silenced 
individuals, can thereby slide into effectively denying the legitimacy of the researched’s 
voice if they should dissent from this subject position (Wray-Bliss, 2003a, explores this 
point more extensively). There is then, an ever present problematic. If, as the preceding 
arguments suggest, ‘silence’ is to be associated with suppression or oppression then, 
from the above, ‘voice’ too can be problematic, it can represent appropriation, 
misrepresentation, or indeed an unwished-for visibility and vulnerability for the 
researched.  
One response that might be seen to mitigate against the potential problems of both the 
exclusion of ‘silence’ and the potential appropriation of ‘voice’ might be that the 
hitherto silenced should represent themselves. Indeed this would seem to speak to the 
‘feel’ of the word ‘voice’, suggestive as it is of agency, of speaking not just being 
spoken about. As hooks has written, in a critique of the academy’s representation of the 
silenced, “oppressed people resist by identifying themselves as subjects, by defining 
their reality, shaping their new identity, naming their history, telling their story” (1989: 
43). Such resistance is not complete if instead another ‘authority’, even a caring and 
sympathetic one, takes the role of defining their reality or telling their story for them 
(hooks, 1989). Here hooks is highlighting the still very pressing need to open up access 
into the academy for those groups and classes of people who, while they may 
increasingly figure as research subjects, still infrequently appear as the subject who 
researches. Paralleling this issue, hooks also recognises the risk of what we might call 
interpretive ghettoisation, where those from minority or oppressed groups who have 
achieved a position in the academy are conferred only an ‘experiential’ authority to 
write about ‘their own kind’, while the rest of the academy is apparently still free to be 
able to critique all peoples. Furthermore, while stressing the need for a more 
representative academy in terms of membership, hooks also recognises the fact that if 
we are not to continue to reproduce the silencing of particular subjects then the existing 
academic community needs to engage with others’ (Others’) silences. Put another way, 
it is not sufficient for the academy to merely reproduce silences on the grounds that we 
must wait for the Other to speak for themselves. Indeed, such a position, if it were 
mooted, would seem to risk reproducing some unwelcome effects, including an 
assumed (essentialist) ‘authenticity’ and/ or ‘representativeness’ (e.g. Collinson, 2002) 
of ‘native’ accounts. If we take seriously the postmodern and postcolonial challenges to 
research practices and the power/knowledge they create then such accounts of course 
can not be read as unproblematic examples of either of these truth claims. This ever-
problematic quality of both silence and voice echoes throughout the work of writers 
such as Gayatri Spivak.  
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Described as a feminist Marxist deconstructivist (MacCabe, 1987: ix) this complex 
combination of signifiers eloquently speaks to Spivak’s intersecting commitments and 
the challenge that these present to her project of marrying a critical academic project, 
with a critique of textual authority and the academic voice, and a critique of (research 
subjects’ and academics’) subjectivity. Thus we find in Spivak’s work a commitment to 
include, for instance, a (feminist) critique of the silencing effects of traditional 
‘authoritative’ academic voice, a (Marxist) political commitment to identify and 
challenge the subordination or silencing of certain classes of (research) subjects, and a 
keen (deconstructivist) awareness that ‘solutions’ tend to slip into the problematic 
position of essentialising either the ‘authentic’ silenced subject who is now ‘given 
voice’ to speak for themselves, or the enlightened academic subject speaking ‘for’ them. 
As Spivak argues,  
it is not a solution, the idea of the disenfranchised speaking for themselves, or the radical critics 
speaking for them; this question of representation, self-representation, representing others is a 
problem….we cannot put it under the carpet with demands for authentic voices… And there has to 
be a persistent critique of what one is up to, so that it doesn’t get all bogged down in this 
homogenization; constructing the Other simply as an object of knowledge, leaving out the real 
Others because of the ones who are getting access into public places due to these waves of 
benevolence and so on. I think as long as one remains aware that it is a very problematic field, 
there is some hope. (1990: 63) 
It is this ‘hope’ of which Spivak speaks, a hope arising from a simultaneous 
appreciation of the political need for critical academic work that challenges the 
historical silencing of particular voices, and an awareness of the ever-problematic 
nature of all such projects, that I now want to carry into an examination of silence and 
voice in CMS.  
Section Two: Silence and Voice in CMS 
‘Silence’ and ‘voice’ are emerging as recognisable themes in CMS and other 
organisational studies research. A recent (September, 2003) Journal of Management 
Studies special issue ‘Speaking up, Remaining Silent: The Dynamics of Voice and 
Silence in Organizations’ saw a range of empirical and theoretical papers exploring 
voice and silence in relation to a variety of organisational issues. While many of these 
articles tended towards a managerialist interpretation, seeing silence as something to be 
overcome by better (more supportive) management or better (more inclusive) 
organisation (Böhm and Bruni, 2003), they did articulate issues of employee dissent, the 
‘silencing’ effects of organisation, and the importance of hearing employees’ (and not 
just management’s) voice – issues that resonate with the critical/ political concerns of 
CMS. Moving towards more self-consciously ‘CMS’ research, a stream entitled 
‘Silence and Voice in Organizational Life’ at the 2003 Critical Management Studies 
Conference saw papers by 11 contributors, including an earlier version of this paper, on 
issues ranging from the multiple voices and silenced subjectivity of doctoral research 
(Copas, 2003) and organisational research in general (Cunliffe and Shotte, 2003), 
graduate trainees dilemma of ‘speaking up’ without ‘speaking out of place’ (Coupland, 
2003), and the socialisation/ subjectivisation of children(‘s voice/silence) within their 
first interactions with an organisational (school) context (Ehrensal, 2003). Even closer 
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to home, Steffen Böhm and Attila Bruni edited a (2003) ‘Silent Sounds’ special issue of 
ephemera exploring the issues of sound and silence in organisation, an issue with links 
to an earlier EGOS 2002 conference stream ‘Silence is (not) Sexy: Organizing Sound 
and Silence’. Though contributors to this special issue engaged rather more with 
‘sound’ than ‘voice’, it shows again the emergence of such issues within CMS. A 
message coming through from each of the above engagements is that the concepts of 
‘silence’ and/or ‘voice’ are proving useful motifs around which to explore issues central 
to CMS such as inequality, exclusion, and dominance as well as resistance, agency, and 
embodiment in organisation.  
The above explicit engagements can also be seen, however, as markers of a more 
lengthy, implicit, echoing of silence and voice throughout CMS. At an ideological level, 
CMS may be defined by its concern to challenge the dominant voice of mainstream 
management knowledge, knowledge which silences the less-than-wholly-enthusiastic 
participants of contemporary organisations (Fournier and Grey, 2000; Parker, 1995). As 
Alvesson and Willmott wrote in the early 1990s a “careful scrutiny of managerial 
discourse and practice in terms of voices that not only speak loudly, but also quietly or 
cannot – yet – be heard is an important task for critical management studies” (1992: 6). 
Since publication of this book CMS researchers have conscientiously turned to this task. 
To try to counter the almost deafening capitalist/ managerialist clamour, CMS has 
reintroduced voices of the oppressed and resistant employee and/or disgruntled 
manager. In addition, some CMS researchers have engaged with other potential 
silences/ silencings within this group. Recognising the relatively high volume of the 
voices of white, male, full-time employees in industrial work organisations as the 
dominant historical subject of ‘critical’ organisational texts, CMS authors have also 
written about other populations. For example, sex workers (Brewis and Linstead, 2000), 
service workers (Sturdy, Grugulis and Willmott, 2001), drug users (Warren and Wray-
Bliss, 2003), the omission/ suppression of gender (Linstead, 2000; Wilson, 1996), as 
well as subjects relating to managed organisations outside of the employment 
relationship (Ehrensal, 2003), have each figured as ‘subjects’ in CMS texts.   
In addition to silence and voice figuring as the interpretive warrant for CMS texts, CMS 
is becoming increasingly aware of the power-laden issues of silence and voice within its 
research practices. Alongside texts raising such methodological issues theoretically 
(Alvesson, 2003; Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000; Ellis, 2001; Gold and Peacock, 2001; 
Jeffcutt, 1994; Wray-Bliss, 2002a), there is some evidence of empirical CMS research 
also taking such issues on board in practice. For instance, CMS tends to avoid overtly 
positivistic truth claims in its empirical texts (a position which by definition 
accommodates no other voices) and instead constructs more interpretive approaches. 
Although, as I have observed previously, it can be argued that positivist relations and 
realist claims are possibly still being subtly reproduced in, for instance, the separation of 
researcher from researched and in the ways that empirical research and the research 
process are reported (Wray-Bliss, 2001). Similarly, though explicit attempts by CMS 
authors to name their own standpoint and central subjective location in the 
interpretations and representations they reproduce are still relatively uncommon, which 
could suggest that CMS authors still prefer to imply a conventional impression of 
disembodied impartial authority (Knights, 1995), there are some examples of authors 
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explicitly locating themselves in their texts and interpretations (Beadle, 2003; Brewis, 
submitted; Collins and Wray-Bliss, submitted).  
In general, from the above, it does seem possible to read into CMS some, still emerging, 
commitment that it will seek to understand and challenge forms of exploitation, 
repression, or subordination, in the (work) organisation ‘out there’ but also, and 
importantly for this paper, within the organisation of its own research processes. There 
is, in other words, an apparent resonance between CMS and the issues of voice and 
silence in the research process raised above. 
However, this resonance of concerns does not equate to an equivalent treatment of 
issues of silence and voice within CMS. Many of those writers on voice and silence in 
research relations that I discussed in Section One above stress the centrality in empirical 
texts of an explicit account of an embodied research ethics, evidenced, for example, in 
an articulation of how responsibility, reciprocity, and accountability with/to the 
researched has been explored (Lincoln, 1993, 1995). But, in general, empirical CMS 
research articles do not seem to articulate or explore such an ethics. Rather, authors and 
journals (and by implication can we assume much of the wider CMS audience/ 
community?) seem content for issues of ‘methodology’ in journal articles to be 
minimally discussed (and research ‘ethics’ often not at all).  
To illustrate this point I wish to take one, particularly marked, example of research with 
an empirical element, published in a leading journal, with minimal reflection upon such 
methodological issues. Courpasson and Dany’s (2003) recent article in Organization 
Studies presents an interesting and rich analysis of obedience in organisations, 
reviewing and critiquing existing understandings of the topic that suggest that obedience 
is a product of ‘soft’ organisational policies that encourage submission to organisational 
goals in exchange for some local autonomy. In setting up their critique of this 
understanding the authors draw upon empirical research taking the form of three short 
‘case studies’ of organisational obedience to answer the question “are these policies in 
line with what we can observe empirically within business firms?” (ibid., 1236). The 
empirical research presented takes the form of the authors’ analysis of three passages, 
presented as ‘B.’, ‘J. M.’ and ‘C.’s spoken reflections upon an organisational situation 
where they felt some compulsion towards obedience. B., J. M., and C.’s voices recall 
highly sensitive, and potentially traumatic, events where they were deeply and 
personally enmeshed in organisational power relationships – relationships that, 
according to the authors, subjected B., J. M., and C, variously to “soft coercion” and 
“exclusion” (ibid., 1237), “violence”, “complicity”, and “explicit and credible threats” 
(ibid., 1239).  
Given the personal sensitivity of the issues that B., J. M., and C. voice, issues that are 
now laid bare by Courpasson and Dany for public consumption, we could by drawing 
upon the above discussion reasonably expect there to be a careful exploration of 
research ethics. Such an exploration might be expected to include how relations of trust 
were established, what negotiation for consent was undertaken, what limits of consent 
were established, and how the authors embodied their accountability to these research 
subjects. On examination however, the text fails to explore any of these, or indeed any 
other, questions of research ethics. In addition to this demonstrating a marked lack of 
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importance accorded to the reporting of research ethics in this published CMS text, this 
neglect is also rather ironic given the authors’ reference to Milgram’s (1974) research 
experiments on obedience and authority – experiments which have become infamous as 
much for their highly questionable research ethics as for their electrifying findings. 
Furthermore, despite the ‘empirical’ cases being central to setting up the authors’ 
subsequent lengthy theoretical critique of existing understandings of obedience in 
organisation, the only engagement with methodology in the text is one line where the 
authors describe their “cases” (ibid., 1238) or “stories” (ibid., 1236) as “some obedience 
dilemmas we have observed over the past few years in different surveys” (ibid., 1236). 
Without any other discussion of methodology we have, as readers, simply no way of 
knowing, for instance, if the ‘empirical cases’ are composites or verbatim accounts, 
whether they reflect original research or secondary sources, or whether indeed they are 
fictionalised.1 We have, in short, no effective basis upon which to judge the ‘data’, and 
we certainly cannot therefore tell from this data, as the authors wish us to, whether 
“something crucial is missing” in existing views of obedience (ibid., 1236). Overall 
then, what might we learn from this example? It is important first of all to state that I do 
not draw the conclusion from this example that these authors don’t have a sound grasp 
of methodology and research ethics – they most probably conducted their research with 
the utmost professionalism and ethical regard. Rather, the point I wish to make is that 
this article eloquently demonstrates that no discussion of methodology and no reflection 
upon research ethics/ relations with research subjects is apparently no barrier to the 
publication of ‘empirical’ CMS research in a leading journal. In short, the article nicely 
illustrates how evidence of ethical/ relational issues of accountability, responsibility, 
and reciprocity with/to research subjects are simply not required of CMS texts. 
While Courpasson and Dany (2003) is, as I stated at the outset, one example of the lack 
of significance accorded methodology/ ethics in published CMS research, it does seem 
to me to be illustrative of a wider pattern. As I have argued, and illustrated, in previous 
writings (Wray-Bliss, 2003a, 2003b) even when methodology is discussed in empirical 
CMS texts it is normally reduced to a list of formal data-gathering methods and a 
statement of how much time in the field, or how many interviews or questionnaires 
were conducted. Such ‘technical’ treatment serves to create the impression that 
methodological concerns – including those ethical issues of responsibility, reciprocity 
and accountability to/ with our research subjects – are somehow peripheral (if indeed 
relevant at all) and that they should be dispensed with quickly so that the more 
‘important’ and ‘interesting’ findings and academic implications can be presented. The 
submission guidelines/ instructions for authors issued by journals that publish CMS 
research, including, amongst others, Human Relations, Journal of Management Studies, 
Organization, and Organization Studies are also illustrative of this point. Each journal 
stresses the importance of ‘high quality’ (OS) research, but quality is only specified in 
__________ 
1  One of the reviewers posed the question of whether it matters if research data is indeed fictionalised. 
In terms of interest and insight, it would seem clear (to someone like myself who is an avid reader of 
fiction) that fictionalised accounts can be very valuable – though I think it is necessary not to claim 
an empirical authority for such a fictionalised account. In terms of whether this matters for the ethical 
issues of silence and voice: while such accounts may not have the ethical responsibility to specific 
research subjects, we could still ask of those accounts how they discharge the responsibility that 
critical academic research can be seen to have in challenging the status of ‘the silenced’ when no 
actual relationship with these subjects is entered into and their voices are not actually to be heard. 
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terms of ‘output’ (i.e. the publication of interesting texts with ‘strong theoretical and/or 
empirical insights’, JMS), and ‘form’ (i.e. style of the text) rather than research process. 
While fairly extensive and specific requirements exist for authors to submit texts that 
conform to a particular textual style, no such guidance is offered, nor requirement that 
authors reflect, upon the ethics of that research, appropriate relations with participants, 
the effect of the research upon the researched community, etc. In fact, the only two 
(implicit) mentions of issues that we could understand (very generously) as concerned 
with ‘ethics’ are JMS’ statement that ‘our only proviso is that authors maintain 
congruity within their own theoretical and methodological positions in the conduct and 
reporting of research’ (notice that JMS does not specify that it requires evidence of such 
‘congruity’ in the text), and Organization’s intention to ‘deal fairly and in good faith 
with potential contributors and readers’ (notice how only contributors and readers – i.e. 
academic subjects again – are cast here as moral subjects). Furthermore, in the case of at 
least one of the above-mentioned journals we can see a more explicit downplaying of 
the significance of attention to methodological issues. Thus in the following guidance 
Human Relations appears to contrast ‘methodology’ with matters of ‘substance’: 
While a description of the theoretical frame adopted by an author necessarily includes some 
consideration of methodology, such consideration does not normally provide more than a small 
proportion of the paper’s content. An overly long explanation of why particular norms and 
standards have been chosen detracts from discussion of substance (emphasis added). (Human 
Relations: undated) 
Again the point I am trying to make here is not that journal editors don’t take 
methodological and ethical issues seriously in their own work, nor that they do not 
expect such serious treatment of these issues by their peers. Rather, the point I draw 
from this is that, as the principle arbiters of the quality of CMS research, journals do not 
stress the importance of, or require evidence of, research ethics from CMS research as 
part of this ‘quality’ mandate. 
In the absence of either explicit guidance on research ethics or requirements that authors 
evidence their own understandings and embodiment of ethical and reflexive practices in 
reflections on ‘methodology’, CMS as an ‘institution’, if we can understand it as such, 
seems to simply trust individual researchers to behave (but not evidence how they have 
behaved) ‘professionally’. This may serve CMS well some of the time, however 
‘professional’ research practices can and do mask silencing effects both within the 
wider social science arena (Smith, 1990) and within our Critical Management Studies 
realm. For instance, previously I have highlighted subordinating representations of non-
managerial employees’ ‘lack’ of, or ‘inadequate’, resistance in texts that purport to have 
a sophisticated understanding of workers’ agency and subjectivity as an example of this 
(Wray-Bliss, 2002b; also Prasad, 2001). In contrast to relying upon ‘normal’ research 
practices as ensuring adequate attention to silence and voice, what those grappling with 
the politics of voice and silence in research practices have emphasised is a need to move 
from ‘normal science’ (Alvesson, 2003; Lincoln, 1993), with its clear demarcations of 
power and privilege between researcher and researched, toward a (radical) re-
negotiation of this relationship. Such re-negotiation, as Section One alluded to above, 
would likely center around much more extensive and public/ published consideration of 
what constitutes ethical relations with the researched, and seek to evidence in the final 
research product how this ethics is embodied.  
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A possible response to such an argument is that academic journal articles are simply not 
the spaces for reflecting upon, embodying, or being accountable for, these kind of 
ethical methodological concerns. However, before such calls are ‘silenced’ as outside 
the boundaries of what we might expect of CMS research in the journals, I would like to 
reflect on the fact that journals have already demonstrated what may be understood as a 
discontent with relying upon unevidenced/ unpoliced individual probity as sufficient 
safeguard of research ethics. So far, however, they have manifested this in regard to 
only one class of research subject. For, when it comes to the CMS researcher critiquing 
the ‘voice’ (i.e. published research) of other CMS academics, journals have 
institutionalised another safeguard to ensure that the latter group’s voice is properly 
represented: namely (and here I return to reflect upon the academic practice that I 
started the paper with) the right of the criticised author to publish a response (see e.g. 
Calás and Smircich, 1993; Collinson, 2002; Hofstede, 2002; McSweeney, 2002; also 
Mintzberg, 19912). I find this ‘right to respond’ significant in the context of the 
preceding discussion of silence and voice, not so much because of the extent of its use 
(‘responses’ do not, after all, appear routinely), but because of what it seems to 
symbolise. As well as potentially providing ‘good copy’ through enabling the academic 
to defend/ elucidate their position more clearly in response to critique and/or, for the 
more voyeuristically minded reader, the opportunity to witness a good textual spat, the 
journal response also signals, to me, an explicit recognition by our academic community 
of the importance of mitigating against the potentially silencing (misrepresenting) 
effects of the published CMS text. Indeed the journal response is more than a mere 
recognition of this. It is at one level an attempt to systematise a procedure whereby the 
research subject has a right to a dissenting public voice if the research represents their 
work critically. The specific ‘procedure’ for facilitating this may well vary between 
journals, but at its most organised it can include notifying the criticised academic 
subject, sending a copy of the original article prior to publication, and fast tracking the 
‘response’ so that it may appear in the same issue as the critique – a critique which is 
likely to have been submitted via the normal lengthy anonymous refereeing-revising-
refereeing process several months before. Such an attempt to institutionalise and rapidly 
process these research subject’s right to voice, to self-representation, as a counter to the 
potentially silencing/ problematising effects of research is, on balance, perhaps to be 
welcomed.  
This guarded rather than wholly enthusiastic welcome stems from my reading of 
Spivak’s (1990) caution to be aware of the ever-problematic quality of all such 
engagements with representation, self-representation, and representing others – a 
reminder that we need to remain aware that exercising ‘self-representation’ (through, for 
example, responding to another’s representation of your voice) does not ‘solve’ power 
relations in the research context. For instance, extending to some academic subjects a 
__________ 
2  As this sample list of respondents would suggest, and my own examination confirms for me, it also 
seems apparent that those academics who respond/ are canvassed for a response tend to be already 
well-established figures in the field. As such it may be worthwhile too to reflect upon the differential 
voice and silence accorded senior vs. more junior CMS academics. However, as I alluded to in the 
introduction, I choose to focus instead on what is for me the rather more pressing and perturbing issue 
of whether giving only academic subjects (whether senior or otherwise) such right to respond 
highlights the differential significance accorded the voice and silence of academic vs. non-academic 
subjects of CMS research.  
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right to respond does not absolve the researcher from their responsibilities towards those 
subjects. Nor does a subject’s self-representing ‘response’ present an authentic account 
free from power effects or the potential to silence. The ‘right to respond’, therefore, is 
not a blueprint for ending the dilemmas of silence and voice in critical research. It is not 
a blueprint, but it is I feel at least a significant, symbolic, recognition of and attempt to 
engage with such issues. As such, in the light of the previous discussion of the 
responsibility of critical academic research to ‘the silenced’, we might consider whether 
such right to a dissenting/ responding voice should be expanded to include other, 
namely non-academic, subjects critiqued in CMS research. I examine the practicality of 
doing this in the Conclusion to the paper. Before this, in Section Three below, I 
consider, and critique, a number of arguments that could be made against extending the 
opportunity of dissenting voice to non-academic research subjects. Specifically, I 
explore whether the critiqued academic research subject justifies a monopoly right to 
voice a response on the basis of: i) a unique potential to suffer harm at the ‘hands’ of a 
text; ii) a monopoly claim to have something interesting to respond; or iii) a likely 
unique awareness of being critiqued in the text; and iv) whether arguments of academic 
freedom might legitimise not extending this right to respond to non-academic subjects.  
Section Three: Prerequisites of Voice, Legitimations for 
Silence? 
i) Harm 
Perhaps a right to respond need only be extended to academics because only they are 
likely to suffer potential harm through another’s representation. For instance, whereas 
the non-academic researched are usually anonymised in research articles, the academic 
research subject is named (by reference to their texts) and thereby is directly and 
individually identifiable. As such it could be argued that the academic research subject 
may be more individually and personally vulnerable to the harmful effects of another’s 
critical voice and, thereby, may warrant the unique protection of the right to voice a 
response. As a defense of the current practice, this seems to have some merit – as 
academics our careers ‘live’, and thus presumably can ‘die’, by the word. However, 
while it is indeed true that the academic research subject will be (often uniquely) 
individually identifiable, as the British Sociological Association makes clear, it is not 
only the effects of research on identifiable individuals that generates ethical 
responsibilities. 
It should be borne in mind that decisions made on the basis of research may have effects on 
individuals as members of a group, even if individual research participants are protected by 
confidentiality and anonymity. (BSA, ‘Statement of Ethical Practice’:1d)  
The ‘effects’ that academic representations of research subjects can have upon groups of 
people can, as feminists, postcolonial writers, queer theorists, disability writers, and 
others have reminded us, be quite injurious.  
When we write about the experiences of a group to which we do not belong, we should think about 
the ethics of our action, considering whether or not our work will be used to reinforce and 
perpetuate domination. (hooks, 1989: 43) 
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Indeed CMS (along with Organisation Studies and Labour Process Theory) has 
demonstrated some recognition of the potentially harmful effects of our academic 
(mis)representations of groups. For example, in such developments in the CMS canon 
as the (re)introduction of ‘gender’ to what was understood as the problematic ‘gender 
neutral’ (Wilson, 1996) or ‘gender suppressing’ (Linstead, 2000) theory of organisation 
(also Knights and Willmott, 1986), and in what has effectively become the 
‘requirement’ (Wray-Bliss, 2003a) that empirical representations acknowledge the 
resistant agency of working class organisational members if they are to avoid being 
charged with quietism or privileging structure over agency, we might sense not only a 
‘disinterested’ academic call for an epistemologically accurate portrayal, but also an 
ethical/ political challenge to CMS to continue to produce less marginalising/ 
subordinating representations. Furthermore, the establishment of CMS as a subject area 
seems of itself to be based upon the idea that management research in general 
reproduces harmful (oppressive) effects for non-managerial members of organisation. 
Already then, there appears to be at least tacit acknowledgement that academic 
representations, including those in CMS texts, can indeed ‘harm’ the researched, not 
just directly as named individuals, but also indirectly as members of groups. If 
academics, therefore, have no monopoly claim to being vulnerable to potential ‘harm’ 
from the published text, then this seems an unconvincing basis upon which to pin an 
exclusive right to voice a response.  
ii) Interest 
Another possible justification for extending the right to voice a response only to the 
academic subject could be that only they would be able to voice the kind of articulate, 
theoretically sophisticated response that we are actually interested in hearing. Leaving 
aside, for the moment, the presumption of the non-academic researched’s ‘ignorance’ or 
‘inarticulateness’ contained herein (a presumption that would not seem to sit well for 
me within CMS wider commitments to challenge, for instance, the class elitism of 
mainstream management texts), there is perhaps something (uncomfortably) close to 
home in this position. As both Seidman (1992) and Stanley and Wise (1983) have 
argued in relation to the older discipline of sociology, and Parker (2002) has argued in 
relation to CMS, Grand Theory (theory with a capital ‘T’) tends to confer status and, 
ultimately, this status confers the right to voice. The voices of the non-academic 
researched are interesting, it can sometimes seem, only to the extent that they 
illuminate, illustrate, or help the academic author to contest a particular Theoretical 
position. That a Theoretical piece of research is divorced from the everyday world, 
directed at elucidating the finer subtleties of some theoretical abstraction, with no 
attempt at making it relevant for specific current events, is apparently no barrier to its 
publication. A piece of empirical work, illuminating what is currently happening to, and 
between, people in organisations, however, stands little chance of being accepted as an 
‘academic’ text unless it shows what it contributes to, or otherwise wraps itself in the 
flag of, ‘Theory’ (Parker, 2002). Extrapolating from the above, we could be excused for 
thinking that the CMS community might feel that little could be added by seeking out, 
any more than empirical texts already do, the ‘subjective’ and ‘non-theoretical’ voices 
of the non-academic researched. Indeed, if we judge the value of an academic work 
narrowly in terms of its contribution to ‘Grand Theorising’, and assume that only the 
academic subject can formulate such Theory, then such a view may be warranted.  
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However, I would argue that there are also reasons to believe that extending the right of 
(dissenting) voice to include also non-academic research subjects could produce ‘better’ 
CMS research – in a number of ways. First, if part of the CMS ‘mission’ is to enable 
those “voices that not only speak loudly, but also quietly or cannot – yet – be heard” to 
be heard (Alvesson and Willmott, 1992: 6, also Section Two above) then exploring ways 
that our texts might enable ‘the silenced’ to have a stronger public voice could be 
understood as itself a politically valuable contribution. Second, if CMS research was to 
become research of a kind that was read and responded to by our non-academic research 
populations then it might well become more accountable to these populations. At 
present if authors wish to critique another academic’s ‘voice’ they have to (or, at least, 
should) craft this critique carefully and substantiate it well. In part I would suggest that 
this is because we know that it is entirely possible that this subject and/or other 
academic members from their particular discipline, ‘school’, or community may become 
aware of and may respond to our representations. It seems plausible then to suggest that, 
if other research subjects may be expected to read and respond to an author’s critical 
representation of them, then the quality of an author’s ‘burden of proof’ may improve 
likewise. Thus, interpretations in CMS texts that are ill-founded or poorly evidenced 
may be thought marginally less likely to find their way into the CMS academic canon. 
Third, if the ‘response’ or ‘voice’ of non-academic research subjects was to be valued 
by CMS more, then it may follow that authors might consider making their texts more 
accessible to such audiences and, as Parker (2002) argues, perhaps as a result more 
influential.  
Can any academic who is seriously concerned with grand words like ‘emancipation’ and ‘justice’ 
afford to ignore issues of readership and effect? What is the point of being a revolutionary, or even 
a reformist, if no one can hear you? (Parker, 2002: 172) 
Finally, if the ‘right to respond’ was extended to non-academic research subjects it 
seems possible that the representations produced in CMS texts may be more ‘faithful’ to 
these research subjects’ own understandings (Lincoln, 1993). Given that methodologies 
deployed in empirical CMS research often tend to be defined as ‘ethnographic’, a 
methodological approach whose warrant is that it allows the researcher to understand 
the culture as the researched themselves do, such ‘faithfulness’ could be seen as another 
marker of ‘better’ empirical CMS research. Returning to points made earlier in relation 
to Spivak’s work (see Section One), such claims of ‘faithfulness’ in empirical 
representations of others’ voices are of course not unproblematic – just as academic 
claims to be able to accurately or authoritatively represent others are not unproblematic. 
However, returning to the issue at the heart of this section, namely CMS’s potential 
‘lack of interest’ in furnishing any but the academic research subject with the right to a 
dissenting voice, I would suggest that grappling with these not unproblematic concepts 
in empirical CMS research could, if nothing else, produce some ‘interesting’ research.  
iii) Awareness 
Following from the above issue of CMS’s interest in research subjects’ voice, I turn 
now to the flip-side issue of research subjects’ interest in CMS’s academic 
representations of them. This is centred, for me, around the issue of awareness. Perhaps 
the non-academic research subject doesn’t need anything like a ‘right to respond’ 
because they are unlikely ever to be aware of how they are represented in the text. 
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Existing research practices might thereby be justified on the grounds that ‘it doesn’t 
matter’; in other words, that CMS research is irrelevant to the lives of our (non-
academic) research subjects (see e.g. Collinson, 2002). This could be seen to legitimise 
the lack of opportunity for voice as a non-problematic silence, for the non-academic 
researched don’t know, and probably wouldn’t care, that they may be being critiqued.  
Again the above argument can be plausibly made, however it still needs to be 
remembered that, according to writers on voice and silence, to be non-oppressive 
silence needs to have been an outcome of consent not suppression (LeCompte, 1993). 
The academic, offered the chance to respond (by becoming aware of, or being invited to 
respond to, the critique), can of course remain silent, and if they choose to do so this is 
an informed decision, an active choice. Such a choice is based not only upon a well 
developed awareness of how academic publishing works, its likely effect for the 
individual, etc, but also upon a reading, if desired, of the article in which their voice is 
critiqued – quite possibly forwarded by the journal prior to publication. An academic 
subject’s choice of silence is broadly ‘agentic’, it can be regarded as ‘freely given’ and 
‘informed’, both commonly understood imperatives of ethical relations with research 
subjects (e.g. BSA, undated: 1b). At present the lack of the non-academic research 
subject’s ‘dissenting/ responding voice’ can not, it seems to me, be described in similar 
terms. Though it is almost certainly wrong to understand these subjects’ lack of a right 
to a dissenting/ responding voice as a result of deliberate exclusion or explicit editorial 
or authorial policy, it does seem fair to describe this silence as a result of an unjustified 
(both in the sense of unarticulated and unjust) ‘omission’ on the part of CMS rather 
more than one of ‘choice’ on the part of non-academic research subjects.  
iv) Academic freedom 
So far, several of the potential legitimations I have explored for not extending to the 
non-academic research subjects a right of dissenting voice have had a somewhat 
defensive, almost apologetic, tone – downplaying, for instance, the potential 
harmfulness or significance of CMS’s research for these subjects. Here, with the 
argument of academic freedom, CMS might have a more forthright opportunity to 
positively legitimise current practice. Academic researchers must guard their freedom to 
critique. Extending to research subjects the right to read and dissent from ‘our’ 
representations of ‘them’ might inhibit us from feeling able to critique them. We may be 
stifled by such questions as: What will they think? Will they be hurt? Will our research 
create “uncalled for self-knowledge” (BSA, undated: 1d)? Indeed, shouldn’t ethical 
research, as the British Sociological Associations ‘Statement of Ethical Practice’ says, 
“attempt to minimise disturbance to those participating in research” (ibid.)? (As if 
ethical research is like some unpleasant medical procedure – one where the patient 
doesn’t even get to see the results when it is all over). Letting the researched see our 
representations of them might make us take regard of their views and values, with the 
consequence that it may become more difficult for us to critique their lives and voices. 
Overall, this argument seems to say, CMS as a critical academic field, must guard its 
right to ‘speak the truth to power’, regardless.  
This defense of academics’ freedom to ‘tell the truth’ unencumbered by such constraints 
as regard for the potentially dissenting voice of the researched is indeed seductive. It 
lends a certain nobility and heroism, almost a mythic quality, to critical academic 
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research. This in itself may not always be a bad thing if it serves to help sustain critical 
work in the face of a still principally managerialist Business School academy. However, 
as a credible justification for excluding the non-academic research subject in CMS texts 
from having a right to respond to, or dissent from, how we represent them I do find it a 
little unconvincing. For instance, this position is open to a Foucauldian critique of 
‘truth’ that reminds us that ‘truth’ is already “a thing of this world” that it is always 
“produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint” (Foucault, 1980: 131). 
‘Academic freedom’ and the ‘truths’ it produces are already and always multiply 
constrained. According to the BSA, when we are thinking about the rights of research 
participants in particular, then such constraint (and restraint) is itself a marker of ethical 
research practices: 
Sociologists, when they carry out research, enter into personal and moral relationships with those 
they study…Although sociologists, like other researchers are committed to the advancement of 
knowledge, that goal does not, of itself, provide an entitlement to override the rights of others. 
(BSA, undated: ‘Relationship with and Responsibilities towards Research Participants’) 
At present the constraints that CMS ‘truth’ is produced under do not seem to extend to 
the right of non-academic research subjects to have a dissenting voice. I would suggest 
that deploying a discourse of ‘academic freedom’ to defend limiting the right to voice of 
research subjects whose ‘oppression’ CMS is committed to end is, like the previous 
arguments around harm, interest, and awareness, less than convincing. 
Conclusions: Responses to Silence and Voice 
This paper has had at its center a specific practice, that of allowing certain academic 
subjects the right to respond to CMS articles that criticise their voice. Despite the 
specificity of this practice, and my own personal experience of being ‘responded to’ that 
prompted these reflections, I have argued that this practice can be regarded as of wider 
significance because of what it symbolises. For me, the ‘right to respond’ signals 
recognition of the potentially silencing effects of the CMS text and an acceptance of the 
need to attempt to mitigate against these effects – in this case through the mechanism of 
allowing the criticised subject a dissenting voice. As such the journal response can be 
regarded as sounding a deeper resonance between the critical/ political academic project 
of CMS and the concerns of those writing on issues of ‘voice’ and ‘silence’ in relation 
to the ethics of research practices. However, this resonance does not signal a harmony. 
For while there appears to be a coincidence of commitments between CMS and texts on 
research ethics/ research relations, I have suggested that CMS has yet to carry these 
commitments wholeheartedly into its research practices and products. In particular I 
have suggested that CMS still marginalises reflection upon, and accountability for, 
issues of research ethics and relations with research subjects. Such issues simply do not 
seem to need to figure in empirical CMS texts seeking publication. I have suggested that 
one eloquent indication of this is the practice of extending the right to ‘respond’ only to 
the academic subject. Reflecting upon this practice in terms of the concepts of harm, 
interest, awareness and academic freedom, I have found no compelling (ethical) reasons 
why only these research subjects should qualify for this right to a responding/ dissenting 
voice.  
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Perhaps, however, I have overlooked the most obvious justification for only extending 
‘voice’ in this way to the academic subject. Perhaps it is simply not possible or practical 
for journals to do otherwise. One reason, after-all, that the academic research subject 
can be given the right to respond by the journal is that they are identifiable (and thereby 
contactable for a response). The anonymity accorded the non-academic research 
subjects in CMS, and other social science, texts clearly normally inhibits extending the 
exact same model of soliciting the researched’s dissenting/ self-representing voice to all 
problematised research subjects. However, rather than this being a blanket legitimation 
for continuing the current uneven access to a (dissenting) public voice, I would like to 
end this paper by tentatively imagining some of the possible alternative strategies and 
practices that CMS journal editors, researchers, and readers could explore to try to 
engage more explicitly with the above issues.  
In addition to publishing academic work and contributing to an (UK) academic’s RAE 
rating and career, journals function as a check on the quality and rigour of academic 
research (see Section Two above). Writers on silence and voice stress the oppressive 
(and empowering) potential of academic research, and argue for judgements of quality 
and rigour to be made more on the basis of research relations/ research ethics. For 
journals that publish CMS research to fulfill this ‘quality control’ mandate there may be 
a need for editors and reviewers to make research ethics (including issues of silence and 
voice) more central as a marker of the quality and rigour of the research they publish. 
Journals could usefully start this process by explicitly naming the potentially silencing 
power relations in guidelines for submission and require of authors that they are familiar 
with, and have abided by, appropriate guidelines on ethical research practice. Such 
guidelines might take a similar form to those of the BSA, for instance, which name 
research as being “frequently characterised by disparities of power and status” (BSA, 
‘Statement of Ethical Practice’: 1a), and recognise that “social research intrudes into the 
lives of those studied” (ibid., 1d) in ways that can readily be experienced as silencing, 
oppressive, or harmful by research participants or ‘subjects’.  
Of course, contributors’ familiarity with guidelines or even ethical codes does not 
necessarily equate with enthusiastic engagement with ethical practice (LeCompte, 
1993). Familiarity can just as easily breed indifference (even contempt), and ethical 
codes can lead to minimal compliance and even, as Bauman (1993) reminds us, to less, 
not more, ethical conduct. Journals would seem to need, therefore, to guide authors to 
reflect more extensively in their submitted texts upon power relations and ethics in the 
research process. Such reflection may necessitate that authors articulate what ethical/ 
political justification their work assumes – especially for such work which uses the 
academic’s rather privileged access to public voice to problematise the voice/ agency of 
the non-academic research subject (Lincoln, 1993). Such texts may need to be asked to 
demonstrate how the research subjects’ voice, including perhaps their critical voice on 
the way the academic has represented them in the text, has been sought and 
incorporated.  
Further, journal editors and reviewers that wish to genuinely engage with the foregoing 
issues of silence and voice, would need to recognise that those texts which make central 
the (ethics of the) relations between research participants may well differ significantly 
in form and content from conventional empirical CMS. To take one example, texts that 
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are ordered around forms of participatory action research will normally be directed at 
exploring issues directly relevant to, and chosen by, research participants in conjunction 
with the researcher. Such issues will not necessarily be those that the wider academic 
community, left to its own sometimes-introspective devices, would find most 
‘theoretically’ stimulating or current. As such, journal reviewers and editors may need 
to make judgements about the quality and contribution of such works from different 
standpoints, evaluating texts not only according to contribution to ‘knowledge’ but also 
(and this is clearly far from unproblematic) contribution to the lives of the researched 
population (Lincoln, 1993). Such a shift may necessitate significant ‘unlearning’ 
(Spivak, 1990) on the part of editors and reviewers (if not a different or widened 
constituency of editors) of the current ways that the status and quality of a piece of 
research is evaluated. At the least, empirical texts would likely need to change shape, 
with reflection on methodology becoming more central and significant than its current, 
often marginal, status. 
To meet demands for more ethical accountability, researchers/ authors too may have to 
unlearn the ways that they come to regard the research process and the empirical text. 
The work of writers on voice and silence (see Section One) may need to be explored 
further, such that research ethics and methodology could become central rather than 
marginal to CMS research practices. As Lincoln writes, 
in the past, comments on method, design strategy, and analytic method, were often missing, or 
merely appended, to ethnographies (Van Maanen 1988). In emerging research on the silent and 
silenced, however, method, strategy and analysis may comprise a more forthright and integral part 
of texts. (Lincoln, 1993: 38)   
The foregrounding of research ethics and methodology may also need to be carried 
through to our other research responsibilities, including supervision, for instance. This 
may necessitate a reversal in the status of what sometimes appears to be the last-to-be-
done, ‘token’ methodology section of undergraduate and postgraduate management 
studies dissertations. For established CMS academics, and those in training, there would 
also seem to be a need for broadening what we understand as CMS’ critical/ anti-
oppressive commitments, to include reflection upon, and embodiment of, non-
oppressive/ non-silencing (but not necessarily therefore uncritical) relations with 
research participants. This may well necessitate much more exploration by CMS 
researchers of those participative, feminist, and action research, methodologies, where 
the issues studied, conclusions arrived at and representations made are “dictated as 
much by the needs and nominations of the studied as by the interests, desires, or biases 
of the studier, or of the current concerns of a funding agency” (Lincoln, 1993: 34).  
Such a broadening of relations with research participants would, as LeCompte (1993) 
reminds us, also ultimately necessitate attempts at using research capital (material, 
symbolic, cultural, political) to not merely ‘voice’ the situation of the silenced, or even 
to enable the researched to ‘voice’ their own lives, but also to contribute towards 
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practically changing the ‘silenced’ status of those that participate with us in CMS 
research.3  
Before I risk getting carried away with an ‘heroic’ image of what social change critical 
academic research might achieve, it of course needs to be acknowledged that academic 
research, with the particular conventions that govern its form and with the rather limited 
audience it achieves, is not necessarily the most effective media through which the 
silenced can be supported in a struggle to be heard.4 Notwithstanding this, however, I 
have argued in this paper: i) that the current (rather conventional) conventions that are 
structuring the form of CMS research texts and research relations are not immutable. 
They can be changed so as to better engage with the political problematic of 
‘representation, self-representation, representing others’ at the heart of at least one 
vision of ‘anti-oppressive’ or ‘critical’ academic research (Spivak 1990: 63). And: ii) 
that while some form of (reconfigured) CMS research may certainly not be the ‘one best 
way’ to practically challenge the silenced status of some of those that we interact with 
in the process of conducting critical management research, for those of us that do decide 
to keep engaging in this research it can surely be argued that we should at least ‘do what 
we can’ with this medium that we continue to invest much time and energy in.  
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